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AIR FORCE HUMINT:
PHOENIX OR ALBATROSS?

by

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Preface

Human Resources Intelligence, or HUMINT for short, is a topic which usually inspires extreme reactions among Air Force members: extreme disinterest, extreme support, or extreme aversion. Those who are disinterested--the majority, I propose--don't know much about the discipline or what it can contribute. The supporters have usually had first-hand operational experience with military or civilian HUMINT and have been impressed with the results. Most detractors of HUMINT have also had first-hand experience, but with a negative outcome.

After losing its organic ability to conduct HUMINT operations in 1995, the US Air Force recently began a project to re-establish the capability on a small scale (hence the allusion to a phoenix.) Although, as a 12-year HUMINT officer, I applauded the initiative, I wasn't sure there was a good understanding of what the resulting functions or structure should be--even within Air Force intelligence.

My purpose in writing this paper is to describe what HUMINT can and should do for the Air Force. By not assuming any prior knowledge on the reader's part, I intend for it to be meaningful to the operator and intelligence expert alike. I hope to provide the "disinterested" reader with a basic understanding of HUMINT's potential benefits; the supportive reader with justification for continued reliance on the discipline; and the skeptical reader with the notion that HUMINT--done smartly--just might have a place in

tomorrow's Air Force. Of course, implementing HUMINT intelligently is essential to avoid its being an albatross in anyone's mind.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the following individuals: Mr. Gary Malanchuk and Capt Keith Beaty of Air Intelligence Agency for their comments, suggestions, and long-suffering assistance in locating reference material; Ms. Debbie Dewey on the Air Staff for inviting me to a key HUMINT workshop; and Dr. Michael Hickok, my research advisor, for his direction and expert advice. Finally, I am grateful to the USAF Institute for National Security Studies for providing the travel funds necessary to conduct my research.

Abstract

From 1946 until 1995, the US Air Force conducted Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) operations in response to Service and national collection requirements. With the formation of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) in 1995, the Air Force lost its entire active duty HUMINT capability. In light of current and future intelligence needs, this paper proposes that the Air Force re-establish an organic capability to conduct allowed HUMINT activities. The paper begins with definitions of HUMINT, a consideration of the place of HUMINT in the future security environment, and current HUMINT capabilities and doctrine, both civilian and military. It then focuses on those functions which an organic HUMINT capability could perform, why they would satisfy Service-unique requirements currently going unfilled, and how the capability may best be implemented. The paper concludes that Air Force HUMINT should assign trained, experienced collectors to Information Operations Detachments collocated with air component commands (numbered air forces and major commands). During peacetime, these personnel would debrief Service personnel on Air Force-unique requirements. During war or conflict, they would deploy with the air component to conduct debriefings; enemy prisoner interrogations; collection management; theater coordination; and other required activities in support of the Commander, Air Force Forces. Resulting intelligence information would be available to the national Intelligence Community, Service, and joint military forces.

Chapter 1

Introduction

What is called 'foreknowledge' cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.

—Sun Tzu
The Art of War

During Operation DESERT STORM a small cell of Air Force intelligence personnel supported the Chief of Intelligence for US Central Air Forces (USCENTAF) by performing the following activities in the area of Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT):¹

- Reviewed raw HUMINT Information Intelligence Reports from worldwide sources
- Passed critical information to the rest of the USCENTAF intelligence staff, particularly the analysis and targeting functions
- Processed and distributed Requests for Information to the Intelligence division of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), theater collection elements, and worldwide USAF HUMINT
- Briefed General Horner, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander, and General Schwarzkopf, Joint Forces Commander, on HUMINT issues
- Coordinated Air Force HUMINT activities directly with Army, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) elements in the theater, as well as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) offices in Washington D.C.
- Provided liaison and support, where possible, to over 60 active duty and Reserve Air Force interrogators attached to Army Joint Interrogation Facilities, Strategic Debriefing Centers, and a Document Exploitation Center in the Kuwait Theater of Operations
- Conducted approved intelligence collections operations in support of Special Forces and sensitive Air Force units

- Debriefed returned U.S. Prisoners of War on board Navy hospital ships in Bahrain and disseminated the results to the national Intelligence Community.

With the exception of Reserve interrogators, the Air Force has had neither the personnel nor infrastructure to duplicate this level of support since 1995. This was a direct result of the transfer of all HUMINT-related billets to form the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) in that year.

Given the past contributions of Air Force HUMINT, future trends in international conflict, and current and future demands on Air Force Intelligence resources, this paper proposes that the Air Force form an organic capability to conduct certain HUMINT activities. These activities would conform to joint doctrine by satisfying the Service-unique requirements of component commands (numbered air forces and major commands) in peacetime and the theater Commander, Air Force Forces during conflict. All intelligence information produced would be available to the national Intelligence Community and ultimately assist the Joint Force Air Component Commander and Joint Force Commander in accomplishing assigned military objectives.

In order to establish a common reference point from which to examine this proposal, we will begin with definitions of HUMINT, to include what it is and is not for the purposes of this paper. We will then briefly consider the place of HUMINT in the battlespace of tomorrow, continuing with current HUMINT capabilities and doctrine within the CIA, DIA, Army, Navy, US Marine Corps, and Air Force. The paper will next examine the functions which an organic HUMINT capability could perform, why they would satisfy Service-unique requirements currently going unfilled, and how the capability may best be implemented. Appendices will present my own implementation recommendations and survey results from senior Air Force Intelligence leadership.

In addition to written documentation, personal interviews, and survey results, I will draw upon my 12 years experience as an Air Force HUMINT collector, operations officer (during two conflicts), planner, functional manager, and commander. My goal in undertaking this project was to explain the nature and potential benefits of HUMINT, and develop a course of action which would benefit the Air Force and joint warfighting teams.

Definitions

HUMINT - the Word

This paper will use the definition of Intelligence from 50 U.S. Code 401a to include "information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons."² Joint Publication 1-02 defines HUMINT as "The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument."³ Going by the strict definition, then, HUMINT is information obtained via a special method of collection using people instead of technical means.

But intelligence personnel frequently use HUMINT to describe the collection method itself. This also makes sense, since different collection methods--a satellite and human eyes, for example--may produce the same, raw intelligence information. If a satellite and an Air Force Service member both observe the same number of aircraft on a runway, it's the method of collection which differentiates between the two activities--not the end result.

Because this paper concentrates on collection activities and functions, we will use HUMINT in the sense of the collection discipline. "HUMINT personnel" will refer to those members of Air Force intelligence (officer, enlisted, and civilian) who have had special training and expertise in the discipline. Currently, only enlisted personnel can have a Special Duty Identifier which identifies their HUMINT background; officers and civilians may only carry "generalist" intelligence Air Force Specialty Codes.

HUMINT - the Discipline

It's an understatement to say that HUMINT is an ambiguous term, leading to various interpretations and expectations depending on the branch of the Intelligence Community using it. To avoid any confusion, we'll start with a general description of the discipline and progress to a more focused definition for the purposes of this paper.

Case Officer vs. Collector. HUMINT methodology involves a specially trained intelligence officer (civilian, officer, or enlisted) obtaining information of intelligence value either directly or indirectly from another person.⁴ Within the Central Intelligence Agency, the career officer is referred to as a "case officer."⁵ The case officer's primary task is to convince a foreign "source" or "agent" to work with him or her (the process is called "recruitment"), and then routinely collect the information which the agent has been asked to obtain.⁶ After recruitment, the case officer "runs," or trains, tasks, debriefs, and sometimes pays the agent. After obtaining intelligence information of value, the case officer prepares a report according to a standardized format and forwards it for dissemination, usually to part or all of the national Intelligence Community.

It's fairly clear that we should regard the details of this kind of activity--recruiting and running foreign agents--as secret or "clandestine." One definition of clandestine

states that, even if such a collection operation were detected, it could not be attributed to a particular country.⁷ At the other end of the spectrum, if an outside observer detected an open, or "overt" HUMINT operation, he or she could identify both the activity and the country associated. Examples could include receiving information from a coalition partner, debriefing an Air Force aircrew member, or interrogating an Enemy Prisoner of War.

It is specifically these types of overt activities which the Air Force should perform using specially trained intelligence officers. Although these individuals would "collect" and report intelligence information from human sources, they would not function as case officers, recruiting and running foreign sources. This distinction between an overt collector and clandestine case officer is extremely important, because current joint doctrine only permits the Services to conduct "overt, non-sensitive HUMINT collection activities to respond to Service-unique intelligence requirements which cannot efficiently be met by the DHS."⁸

It's clear from this statement that, in addition to being "overt" and "non-sensitive," Service HUMINT must also satisfy "Service-unique" needs. I'll address this subject in greater detail in Chapter 3, but one way Air Force HUMINT must conform to the doctrinal requirement is by focusing on support to the numbered air forces (NAFs) and major commands (MAJCOMs).

Level of HUMINT Support. To define the level at which Air Force HUMINT will operate, we must first look at larger HUMINT organizations. The CIA has historically focused on serving the President, the National Security Council, and departments and agencies in the Executive Branch.⁹ The Defense Intelligence Agency

(and by association, DHS) operates at the national and operational levels to satisfy the requirements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and other DoD and non-DoD components.¹⁰

It is thus left to the Services to support their component commanders with time-sensitive information crucial to achieve military objectives, both combat and non-lethal. By supporting the NAFs and MAJCOMs, Air Force HUMINT can satisfy immediate needs which no other intelligence organization is tasked to fill on a full-time basis while avoiding duplicating the efforts of national and theater HUMINT actors. Examples could include debriefing knowledgeable Service members on runway conditions prior to a humanitarian mission (time-sensitive information required for an intra-theater operation), or interrogating the rare enemy prisoner flight mechanic on the status of enemy aircraft.

Resources. Another factor which defines the nature of Air Force HUMINT is the type of resources used to create and sustain it. The Services rely on a Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) budget for their own intelligence programs which provide direct information support to military operations and constitute a part of basic military force structure. The DoD direction which formed the Defense HUMINT Service gave the Services the explicit right to use TIARA funds to create organic HUMINT capabilities subject to the conditions already described.¹¹

Jointness

While stressing the importance of support to the air component commanders, it's equally important to point out that "Air Force HUMINT" does not conflict with the concept of jointness any more than the term "Air Force airlift." Although it would constitute a dedicated Service capability, Air Force HUMINT--like that of the Army and

Navy--would share all information at the national and theater levels in support of the joint goal of Information Superiority.¹² This contribution to joint force and combatant command requirements not only makes sense but is also mandated by joint and Air Force doctrine.¹³ Air Force HUMINT activities would also be fully coordinated at the theater and national levels, as required, in both peacetime and conflict.

What Air Force HUMINT Is Not

It's important to point out what Air Force HUMINT does not include for the purposes of this paper. The first exception is counterintelligence, or "information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments..."¹⁴ The HUMINT discipline can and should contribute to the joint concept of Full Dimensional Protection (a function of counterintelligence), but it's the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) which is "the only Air Force organization authorized to conduct counterintelligence activities and operations."¹⁵

Force Protection is rightfully a standing collection requirement for any intelligence organization or collection discipline (such as Signals Intelligence). But casting it as a dedicated mission of HUMINT would risk impinging on the assigned mission of AFOSI and conflicting with their critical operations during times of conflict. It could also result in putting Air Force collectors in physical danger by involving them in counterintelligence operations for which they have neither the requisite training nor experience.

For some of the same reasons, readers should also not confuse an Air Force HUMINT capability with the Army definition of "tactical HUMINT." Although this

term contains many functions which Air Force intelligence should perform, it also contains uniquely Army activities (such as long-range surveillance) and is frequently associated with counterintelligence.¹⁶

Summary

For the purposes of this paper, Air Force HUMINT will mean the formal, standardized method of using specially trained intelligence officers to collect and report intelligence information from human sources in response to the unique requirements of Air Force component commanders. Air Force HUMINT personnel would conduct only overt, non-sensitive, fully coordinated operations, and all resulting information would be disseminated to joint, combatant command, and national intelligence organizations. Air Force collectors would not function as clandestine case officers, nor would they try to perform the same functions as their Army counterparts or attempt to duplicate the efforts of specially trained AFOSI officers.

But why even talk about HUMINT when the Air Force already has a comprehensive intelligence collecting infrastructure? To answer this, we must first consider the underlying need for HUMINT in the battlefield of tomorrow, and what other organizations are already doing in this area.

Notes

¹ Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 1992), 339.

² Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 5.

³ Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *DoD Dictionary*, April 1997, 250.

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⁴ House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century*, 104th Cong., (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 183.

⁵ Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft*, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992), 77-79.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 9.

⁸ Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, Annex A to Appendix C, *Human Intelligence* (U), 20 November 1996, C-A-4. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

⁹ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 61.

¹⁰ DoD Directive 5105.21, *Defense Intelligence Agency*, 18 February 1997, 2-3.

¹¹ William J. Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, subject: Consolidation of Defense HUMINT, 2 November 1993.

¹² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, 1997, 16.

¹³ Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, Annex A to Appendix C, *Human Intelligence* (U), 20 November 1996, C-A-4. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; Department of the Air Force, *Global Engagement*, 1997, 14.

¹⁴ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 5.

¹⁵ Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 71-1, *Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence*, 3 March 1995, 1.

¹⁶ Army Field Manual (FM) 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 27 September 1994, 2-6.

Chapter 2

The Role of HUMINT

Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.

—Sun Tzu
The Art of War

What's so special about the HUMINT discipline in general? What does it provide the warfighter that sophisticated, technical intelligence (TECHINT) methods cannot? The answer is a simple one: HUMINT--whether clandestine or overt, Service or national-level--can give us insight into an adversary's plans and intentions unavailable through other means.¹ The value of such information is obvious: it allows a commander to plan and conduct operations in such a way as to achieve the military objective in minimal time with minimal casualties and cost.

HUMINT vs. TECHINT

This is not to say that signals intelligence and other forms of technical collection cannot provide similar insights. Though the technical disciplines are valuable at collecting information about what an adversary is doing and how they are doing it, they are sometimes weak at explaining why an adversary is taking a particular course of action and *predicting* what he may do in the future.² Technical collection also does not provide

access to the plans and intentions of foreign governments and organizations that are deliberately kept secret.³ A refugee, defector, or coalition partner, on the other hand, can potentially report on tactics the adversary will use against US airpower, on the effects of US air operations, or on enemy air campaigns.

This is not to say that HUMINT is superior or TECHINT inferior in all cases. On the contrary, they can complement one another, filling in the data which the other cannot obtain. Collecting communications information (COMINT), for example, is still necessary to overcome the pervasive secrecy of many closed societies, such as North Korea.⁴

The Cost of HUMINT

It is also important to point out the inherent cost advantage of HUMINT relative to TECHINT. Organic Service HUMINT is extremely cheap, since its collection "platforms" are people. Expenses for Service collectors are generally limited to military pay, civilian pay, training, facilities, and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. Although specialized computer and communication systems are gradually entering the HUMINT discipline, they still do not approach the multimillion dollar budgets of complex air and space collection assets. As an example, Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) allocated \$373,000 in operating and maintenance funds to support limited HUMINT activities through Fiscal Year 97.⁵

Future Role of Intelligence

Before examining the role of HUMINT in Air Force intelligence, one should first consider the place of intelligence in our current and future national security structure, and whether HUMINT in general contributes to that structure.

There is little doubt that the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled security against overt foreign military threat, and that this position will continue for some years. At the same time, it is clear that foreign powers will continue to plan secret actions which could have serious impact on U.S. interests, political, economic, or military. The National Security Strategy summarizes these threats as regional or state-centered, transnational, and those associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁶ The same Strategy states that the US must remain engaged throughout the world in order to shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crises, and prepare today for an uncertain future.⁷ The nation's leaders recognize that today's world, while safer for the US than that of the Cold War, is still fraught with dangers to our citizens and interests; and that we must also remain active in the world for the sake of maintaining national security for ourselves and our allies.

The task of remaining "engaged" in a dangerous world requires information. Leaders from the President to the Air Force fighter squadron commander need to know the nature of current threats, future potential threats, available options, and the results of actions taken. Although the Information Revolution has provided more information than we can sometimes reasonably use, there will continue to be countries, governments, and groups that will keep their actions and plans secret. Obtaining information about "things

foreign” that is not available through open, conventional means is the purpose and function of intelligence.⁸

Intelligence produces unique insights which potentially avoid conflict, help achieve national and military objectives, enforce international agreements, direct investment in the correct type and quantities of military equipment, and protect US interests at home and throughout the world.⁹ For these reasons, both House and Senate Commissions concluded in 1996 that the US should preserve a strong intelligence capability, to include military HUMINT.¹⁰

Future Role of HUMINT

We’ve already referred to HUMINT’s potential ability to provide insight into an adversary’s plans and intentions. Before assuming that these features will carry over into an Air Force HUMINT capability as defined in Chapter 1, one should ask how HUMINT will contribute to the future military operating environment. Will the unique abilities of the HUMINT discipline support future military intelligence requirements?

Recent tensions and threats of military action by Iraq and North Korea demonstrate the continuing possibility for large-scale military conflict. At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, US military operations have become increasingly involved in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), to include the well-known functions of peace operations, humanitarian assistance, enforcing exclusion zones, and combating terrorism.

This observation parallels an apparent worldwide growth in violent extremism, overpopulation, demands for water and energy, narcotics trafficking, and spread of weapons of mass destruction. The administration’s increased use of MOOTW is also

consistent with the National Security Strategy of engagement and the desire to shape the international environment in ways favorable to US interests. If, as some suggest, future wars will be fought not by the armies of nations, but by groups and organizations using terrorism and other unsophisticated means to win the "souls of men" rather than extend territories, then we can only expect to see a continued use of MOOTW to achieve national and military objectives.¹¹

MOOTW imposes special requirements on the intelligence process. In many cases the "adversary" (if there is one) does not belong to a structured military force, is indistinguishable from the civilian population, does not possess sophisticated combat or communications equipment, and is not intent on direct, combat confrontation. Still, the US military commander must know the military capabilities and intentions of all players involved in a theater in order to achieve the assigned military objectives and protect US and coalition forces.

The entire Intelligence Community can contribute to the warfighter's needs during MOOTW, but conditions may render some disciplines more effective than others. Signals intelligence is limited against a force using primitive land-line communications or couriers, or practicing radio silence (as in DESERT STORM). Imagery intelligence is limited against guerrilla forces which do not mass in the open, do not possess large pieces of equipment, and blend in with the civilian population (as in Vietnam). Organic Service HUMINT, on the other hand, can operate relatively freely in a non-combat environment to provide highly detailed information on military, civil, and political capabilities, tactics, and intentions.

Past Performance of Military HUMINT

The performance of Service HUMINT during recent military operations gives a good indication of how it may contribute during future major regional conflicts and MOOTW.

Service HUMINT during Operation DESERT STORM was often a valuable source of information on Iraqi military capabilities and intentions. For example, interrogation of Iraqi Army and Republican Guard prisoners revealed data on troop movements, targeting of coalition forces, and Iraqi artillery procedures. This information helped planners conduct effective air attacks against troops and logistics targets. US aircrew debriefs also provided insight into Iraqi air defense tactics, weapons, and bomb damage assessment.¹²

Marine Corps operations during Operation RESTORE HOPE in 1993 provide an excellent example of the effective use of Service HUMINT in MOOTW. When lead elements of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit landed in Mogadishu, Somalia, the Marine Forces commander quickly established priority HUMINT collection requirements aimed at the organization and activities of clans, weapons caches, and arms markets. Marine HUMINT efforts led to the capture of large amounts of arms and supplies and contributed to a secure environment for humanitarian activities.¹³ They provided the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander insight into Somali perceptions of the US and UN. They also compiled comprehensive intelligence information which the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force utilized when they returned to Somalia in 1995 to withdraw UN forces during Operation UNITED SHIELD.

Limitations

To be fair, HUMINT has restrictions just as the TECHINT disciplines. While it is less restricted by weather and does not depend on sophisticated technical systems, it is limited by access to sources with the "right" kind of information and by the ability to produce information when it is needed.¹⁴ A military collector can be very active debriefing Service members and coordinating coalition partners, but this does not guarantee the information which the component commanders need. Since HUMINT of all types does not "surge" well, i.e., transition from a peacetime to a combat environment, it's also critical to develop and implement operations in advance of anticipated operations.¹⁵ Given the minimal cost of organic Service HUMINT, dedicating resources to areas of *potential* conflict during peacetime can provide component and combatant commanders with detailed pictures of the battlespace before forces engage in combat.

Information Operations

While still on the topic of future military operations, it's important to touch briefly on Information Operations, or "Those actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."¹⁶ Just as some visions of the future predict conflicts among religious bands or economic cartels rather than states and governments, others predict "information wars" fought for the control of knowledge.¹⁷ Here again, TECHINT methods will undoubtedly provide essential information to facilitate both US offensive and defensive Counterinformation activities. But there will still be activities, plans, and details which will remain secret from the best signals and imagery collection systems.

In these cases, organic Service HUMINT can provide missing information available only from people. Service member debriefs during peacetime can reveal information capabilities in potential areas of conflict. During conflict, refugees, prisoners, and coalition members can provide insight into critical adversary passwords, hardware, defensive information tactics, and plans to attack US systems. Since information like passwords and the location of key network servers is often tightly controlled, HUMINT may be the only discipline capable of gaining access. It's for this reason that the AIA commander, Brig Gen James Miller, feels the need for focused HUMINT collection actually increases with the entrance of Information Warfare into a conflict.¹⁸

National HUMINT Capabilities

To complete our preparation to examine Air Force HUMINT, it's vital to look at current US civilian and military capabilities.

CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency, established by the National Security Act of 1947, has become the primary collector of foreign intelligence using clandestine HUMINT.¹⁹ The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is the head of the US Intelligence Community (IC) as well as statutory head of the CIA. The Directorate of Operations within the CIA is responsible for conducting worldwide clandestine HUMINT operations in support of national requirements.²⁰ In this branch of the discipline, they are the true professionals, with a history stretching back to the Office of Special Services active during WW II. The Deputy Director for Operations also has the role of national

HUMINT Collection Manager and has run the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC) since 1992.²¹ The NHRTC's decisions as to which HUMINT element should collect against which intelligence requirement are binding on both the CIA and DoD--we'll see the impact of this later. The CIA also contains a Directorate of Intelligence that produces all-source assessments.

The CIA focuses on intelligence support to the President, National Security Council, and agencies in the Executive branch. Since 1992, it has also provided analysis to Congress on request. Thus, the CIA's collection activities are almost always focused on the national, strategic level rather than tactical "battlefield" objectives. This is not to say that the CIA does not support tactical military intelligence needs. Despite media and other reports to the contrary, my own experience showed that local CIA support to Air Force HUMINT activities during Operation DESERT STORM was absolutely superb, providing streamlined coordination and direct assistance to sensitive military operations.²² Nevertheless, concern over inadequate support to the military prompted the CIA to create an Office of Military Affairs shortly after the Gulf War.

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency, created in 1961, supports the Secretary of Defense, his staff, and the military Services with current intelligence information, collection requirements management, centralized tasking, analysis coordination, and operational standardization. The Director of DIA also supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff as head of a "combat support agency" and as their main intelligence advisor.²³

As part of its growing operational involvement, DIA formed the Defense HUMINT Service in 1995 to conduct HUMINT for the DoD. Using the justification of reducing the cost of four separate military HUMINT organizations and improving coordination, DHS absorbed all DIA-funded billets formerly managed by the Services. This effectively dissolved Air Force HUMINT, since all personnel but the Reserve Interrogators filled billets provided by DIA.

DHS reportedly devotes 80 percent of its resources to collecting publicly available information and other "overt" activities, and 20 percent to clandestine HUMINT in coordination with CIA.²⁴ While DIA is dedicated to supporting military operations of all types, it typically focuses on the strategic and operational levels to respond to tasking from the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Unified Commanders, and the Joint Staff.

Army HUMINT

Switching now to organic Service HUMINT capabilities, we begin with the Army. The Army continues to have by far the most robust HUMINT structure dedicated to collection at the tactical level. Military Intelligence Brigades and Battalions use multisource collection methods to focus intelligence support downward to the commander.²⁵ A special function of HUMINT teams within the Military Intelligence Collection and Exploitation Battalion is to coordinate and interact with their theater counterparts in other US Services, national and allied forces, and local civil authorities.²⁶ This builds trust and efficiency among coalition HUMINT collectors.

Army HUMINT includes activities such as enemy prisoner interrogation, exploitation of enemy documents, returned US prisoner debriefs, long-range surveillance,

overt collection from US and allied troops, and Low Level Source Operations.²⁷ (These use local foreign nationals to provide counterintelligence/force protection information on people and events gained from their routine daily activities.) Interrogation and Exploitation Companies and Platoons at theater internment facilities and forward locations are dedicated to interrogating enemy prisoners and other personnel of intelligence interest, and to exploiting captured documents.²⁸ Because of its HUMINT expertise and manning, the Army serves as DoD Executive Agent for the enemy prisoner of war program.²⁹

The Army recognizes that, as traditional combat scenarios become less likely, organic Service HUMINT will increase in value to counter unconventional activities.³⁰ Army Field Manual 34-1 goes so far as to state that "HUMINT is the most important discipline in many OOTW activities for collecting information and understanding the AO [Area of Operations]. Whether collected by US or host nation personnel, HUMINT contributes the most to understanding the population, its culture and needs, and the operational environment."³¹

Unlike the Air Force, Army has historically used TIARA funding for its interrogators. This means that when DIA absorbed all the Air Force's HUMINT billets in 1995, the Army's tactical-level capability remained unaffected. There are currently about 750 TIARA billets in the Army dedicated to HUMINT (specifically, the interrogation Military Operation Specialty).

Navy and Marine Corps HUMINT

The Navy and Marine Corps have a long tradition of appreciation for the value of HUMINT. Beginning in 1940 with the creation of the Special Intelligence Section of the

Office of Naval Intelligence's Foreign Intelligence Branch, the Navy has been active in all aspects of HUMINT--controlled, overt, and technical.³² Marine Interrogation teams augmented the Joint Interrogation Facilities during Operation DESERT STORM for as long as there was a possibility of obtaining enemy prisoners with naval information.

Both services recognize that in an increasingly unstable world, HUMINT may provide better information on a technically unsophisticated adversary than electronic methods.³³ Because of the forward presence and rapid deployment capability of naval forces, MOOTW situations in the future may require an increased need for service collection assets and the early deployment of tactical HUMINT teams. For this reason, Navy doctrine has identified the need for an expanded organic collection capability and increased emphasis on tactical HUMINT.³⁴

The Navy does not have the Army's extensive HUMINT assets, but has relied on its fleet intelligence billets and Marine Corps TIARA manning to satisfy Service-unique requirements during peacetime and conflict. The formation of DHS, therefore, did not erase all organic HUMINT capability. In addition to its fleet personnel, the Navy has dedicated 24 Reservists to enemy prisoner interrogation duties. The Marine Corps currently has about 160 TIARA billets assigned to Marine Expeditionary Units to conduct tactical HUMINT collection in MOOTW and conflict.

Air Force HUMINT

Until organized Air Force HUMINT ceased to exist in 1995, it produced valuable intelligence information and garnered the highest awards of the national Intelligence Community. Beginning with the 1st Air Intelligence Service Organization in 1946, various elements were responsible for debriefing repatriated German prisoners of war,

Japanese prisoners returning from the Soviet Union and China, Hungarians fleeing from Soviet occupation, and returning US Prisoners of War (POWs) from Vietnam.³⁵ Resulting intelligence information included Soviet plans and capabilities, targeting data, and casualty data from Southeast Asia.

Air Force HUMINT came under a single manager in 1981 with the creation of the Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC), Ft Belvoir VA. This organization managed and conducted worldwide HUMINT collection operations of all types in response to national and Service intelligence needs. At its largest, AFSAC managed over 400 military and civilian personnel at three theater centers, ten detachments, and numerous operating locations. AFSAC deactivated in 1991 when the Air Force Intelligence Command (AFIC) (known formerly as Electronic Security Command and currently as the Air Intelligence Agency) assumed control of Air Force HUMINT.

In August 1995 the 67th Intelligence Wing (AIA) created a small flight within the 67th Operations Support Squadron to provide administrative and operational support to over 50 Reserve interrogators. In spite of the transfer of active duty billets to DHS in October, this allowed AIA to fulfill its obligation to supply the air component commands with interrogators under approved Operation Plans.³⁶

Following the formation of DHS and the loss of organic Air Force HUMINT, the former commander of Air Intelligence Agency, Maj Gen Michael Hayden, directed the re-establishment of a limited, active duty Air Force HUMINT capability in June 1996.³⁷ This capability was to comply with DoD guidelines by satisfying the Service-specific needs of component commanders via overt, non-sensitive activities. To implement this direction, AIA formed an active-duty HUMINT flight in April 1997 within the 67th

Intelligence Wing's Operations Support Squadron. The flight consisted of 15 TIARA-funded billets drawn from AIA's own resources.³⁸ (This included the earlier interrogator support billets.)

The flight's missions are to collect and report information from human sources and captured documents in response to the requirements of Air Force component commanders; supply HUMINT specialists as needed to Force Protection Teams; and train and equip 75 Reservist interrogators.³⁹ How Air Force should use its current resources is discussed in Chapter 3.

Summary

This chapter has established the following background for examining Air Force HUMINT: the HUMINT discipline can complement technical collection by providing unique insight into the capabilities, plans, and intentions of an adversary; there is a recognized need for continuing intelligence, to include HUMINT, in both future major conflicts and MOOTW; the CIA is the nation's premier clandestine collection organization providing support to the national leadership; DHS conducts overt and clandestine HUMINT collection primarily to satisfy the intelligence needs of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the Unified Commanders; the Army has a large, tactical HUMINT force and is normally executive agent for enemy prisoner operations; the Navy and Marine Corps use fleet and tactical assets to conduct Service-unique HUMINT operations; and the Air Force established a 15-person active duty HUMINT cadre in 1997 to meet Air Force component commander needs. We will now consider what Air Force HUMINT should actually do, and why.

Notes

¹ Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, 20 November 1996, III-27.

² Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft*, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992), 322.

³ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 64.

⁴ Abram N. Schulsky, *Silent Warfare*, (McLean VA: Brassey's (US), 1991), 31.

⁵ Talking Paper, Mr. Gary Malanchuk, Air Intelligence Agency, subject: AIA Tactical HUMINT Initiative, 16 June 1997.

⁶ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997, 5-6.

⁷ Ibid., 2, 6.

⁸ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 5.

⁹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁰ Ibid., xvi-xvii.; House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century*, 104th Cong., (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 1, 18.

¹¹ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, (NY: The Free Press, 1991), 215.

¹² Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 1992), 175, 342.

¹³ Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, *Intelligence*, 7 June 1997, 99.

¹⁴ Army Field Manual (FM) 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 27 September 1994, 2-4.

¹⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*, 5 May 1995, IV-7.

¹⁶ Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, September 1997, 81.

¹⁷ Dr. George Stein, "Information War-Cyberwar-Netwar," in *Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues*, ed. Barry R. Schneider et al. (Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, September 1995), 153.

¹⁸ Brig Gen James Miller, Commander, Air Intelligence Agency, Kelly AFB TX, interviewed by author, 9 Dec 97.

¹⁹ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 61.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century*, 104th Cong., (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 194, 222

²² Ibid., 185.

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²³ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 108.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 114.

²⁵ Army Field Manual (FM) 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 27 September 1994, v.

²⁶ Army Field Manual (FM) 34-37, *Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 15 January 1991, 6-8

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 6-1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6-7, 6-8.

²⁹ Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 1992), 579.

³⁰ Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-75, *Intel XXI: A Concept for Force XXI Intelligence Operations*, 1 November 1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 19 December 1997, available from <http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-75.htm>.

³¹ Army Field Manual (FM) 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 27 September 1994, 6-2.

³² Capt Wyman H. Packard, USN (Ret.), *A Century of US Naval Intelligence* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1996), 130-135.

³³ Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, *Intelligence*, 30 September 1994, 23; Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, *Intelligence*, 7 June 1997, 55.

³⁴ Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, *Intelligence*, 30 September 1994, 56-57.

³⁵ Capt Larry Grant, *Air Force HUMINT 40th Anniversary 1949-1989*, (Ft Belvoir VA: Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC), 1989), 8.

³⁶ Background Paper, 67th Operations Support Squadron (AIA), subject: Tactical HUMINT, November 1997.

³⁷ Talking Paper, Mr. Gary Malanchuk, Air Intelligence Agency, subject: AIA Tactical HUMINT Initiative, 16 June 1997.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Concept of Operations, 67th Operations Support Squadron (AIA), subject: USAF Active-Duty HUMINT Flight (U), Appendix A, *Mission* (U), 4 March 97. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

Chapter 3

What, Why, and How

One who confronts his enemy for many years in order to struggle for victory in a decisive battle yet who, because he begrudges rank, honours and a few hundred pieces of gold, remains ignorant of his enemy's situation, is completely devoid of humanity. Such a man is no general; no support to his sovereign; no master of victory.

—Sun Tzu
The Art of War

As proposed in Chapter 1, the Air Force should have an organic HUMINT capability dedicated to satisfying the intelligence needs of component commanders. In light of AIA's decision to establish a 15-person active duty HUMINT cadre, the reader may well ask whether my proposal is academic. The answer is no, for two reasons. First, there is little documentation available to justify the existence of HUMINT in the Air Force, especially relative to other national and Service elements. Second, although General Hayden based his decision to form a cadre on a perceived need within Air Force Intelligence, he left the details of 'what', 'why', and 'how' to his staff. It is these details, shaped by the needs of Air Force components and evaluated by the Air Staff program management process, which will determine the final existence, function, and form of Air Force HUMINT.

We will now apply the questions of 'what', 'why', and 'how' to the basic proposal. Survey results reflecting the views of senior leaders at the Air Staff, Air Intelligence Agency, Major Commands, and Numbered Air Forces, appear in Appendices B and D.

What and Why

Any functions performed by Air Force HUMINT must first conform to joint guidelines that they be overt, non-sensitive, and satisfy Service-unique requirements that DHS cannot efficiently meet.¹ Secondly, since any HUMINT capability will be limited, the Air Force must perform these functions to satisfy the immediate, critical needs of the component commands, that is, numbered air forces and major commands. In this regard, the Air Force should also employ HUMINT "smartly", that is, how and where it makes sense. HUMINT doctrine must remain flexible, evolve to reflect past successes and failures, and not be applied only to justify its own existence.

Wartime/Conflict Functions

During war or MOOTW, HUMINT activities must help the intelligence staff (A2) of the deployed Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) satisfy the intelligence needs of the Joint Force Air Component Commander and Joint Force Commander. Using past Air Force experience and current Service doctrines as a basis, activities under direct control of the COMAFFOR/A2 could include some or all of the following: debriefing Air Force operational personnel, refugees, defectors, coalition members, cooperating local sources, and repatriated/recovered US prisoners; enemy prisoner interrogations; document exploitation; observation; collection management; and theater coordination.

Debriefings. This is the central function of any Service HUMINT capability, the activity which makes the collection discipline unique within intelligence. Whether it involves a refugee who once directed computer operations in an enemy command and control installation, an Air Force Security Policeman who has seen airfield conditions at a remote location, or a coalition partner who is offering to share data from his or her own sources, people within a theater of

operation can contribute significantly to the overall intelligence picture. Intelligence units at the squadron level have always conducted aircrew debriefs, but a dedicated, trained, organic HUMINT capability would offer the following advantages: identify priority collection opportunities based on component needs; debrief personnel using the most recent intelligence requirements; prepare raw intelligence reports in DIA-required formats; and disseminate the information for use by the entire US Intelligence Community.

There is little question as to the potential value of information collected in the above manner. But we must ask several questions as to why such collection requires an organic capability, and whether such a capability addresses Service-unique Air Force needs.

First, why does debriefing require special training and experience not available with most generalist intelligence personnel? There is no approved DoD definition for "debriefing," but one may think of it as simply the thorough, detailed questioning of a *cooperating* person on what they have seen or heard, usually by an individual with some expertise in the subject area using some type of prepared questions.

This process of questioning, listening, recording, and reporting may sound straightforward, but it's not. It takes training and practice to get the most information out of an individual, separate fact from supposition, pursue tangential areas based on verbal clues, and prepare a concise, factual report. Just asking prepared questions and recording answers would be a task which any intelligence officer or enlisted person could perform. But the process of drawing out or "eliciting" information from a person is often more an art than a science. Debriefing someone without the special training and practice unique to the HUMINT discipline runs the risk of misinterpreting or overlooking vital information which the source doesn't even know is important. To be effective, the HUMINT collector must have established debriefing

expertise (it can't be learned overnight), a Service background, and in-depth knowledge of component needs. A foreign language ability is also highly desirable--even mandatory--in some cases.

This brings up the next question: given the need for debriefing skills, why would the HUMINT collector have to be an Air Force member? Put another way, what makes a collection requirement so uniquely Air Force that an Army collector, for example, could not satisfy it? The answer is twofold: technical knowledge and general background.

Deployed component commanders have critical intelligence needs which are specific to their individual Services and operations. The Army commander needs to know what kind of reactive armor enemy tanks carry; the Navy commander needs to know what type of mines may be floating offshore; and the Air Force commander needs to know what export variant of air-to-air missile enemy aircraft carry. These are all needs best addressed by members of those Services most familiar with the subject areas. The Army collector may know something about air-to-air missiles, but he or she cannot be so knowledgeable as someone who has spent years dealing with the subject. The Air Force collector will certainly know something about fighter aircraft, but he or she will probably not be able to address the same questions on air-to-ground tactics which are common knowledge to the Marine collector.

The respective commanders also need their requirements satisfied sooner rather than later. They may submit requests for information to theater and national HUMINT organizations, but these are already going to be saturated with strategic and operational-level requests. To take advantage of collection opportunities as they occur within a theater, component commanders need to have HUMINT assets at their command who understand the technical and operational details of their Service.

The second reason for having Air Force HUMINT collectors--general background--goes back to the debriefing skill of elicitation. Even if an Air Force collector has a comprehensive list of Army-prepared questions to ask a refugee, the collector probably won't know if the source has additional, unexpected information which may be of equal or higher value. The Air Force collector may discover the source knows nothing about reactive armor on enemy tanks, but he or she won't have the general, Army-related background to recognize and pursue an offhand comment about their targeting system. Although this may seem a farfetched scenario, many debriefs produce valuable information which is totally unexpected--but only if the collector has the background and experience to recognize and pursue the clues presented.

The last question is related to the first two: given the need for a HUMINT-specific debriefing skill and Service-specific knowledge, why not just ask DHS to collect against Air Force component requirements? There are three answers to this question: operating procedures; focus of support; and manning.

First, it is DHS practice is to assign personnel to a collection opportunity regardless of background. There are many cases in which this approach is effective, especially if it relates to theater-wide needs such as availability of drinking water. But, as we've pointed out, the Services also have unique needs which require specific technical and general knowledge to get the most out of an available source. Sending an Air Force officer to collect on torpedoes probably won't be so effective as sending a Navy collector with background in submarines.

Second, although DHS is dedicated to supporting all levels of joint warfare, joint doctrine clearly states that "The objective of joint intelligence operations is to provide the joint force commander with a timely, complete, and accurate understanding of the adversary and the environment."² Naturally, support to a Service component would indirectly support the joint

force commander. But in prioritizing scarce theater resources, the theater joint intelligence staff and DHS-manned HUMINT Operations Cell will rightly focus on strategic and operational intelligence requirements of immediate interest to the theater commander and national leadership.

Finally, the question of prioritizing assets is also one of manning: DHS simply cannot satisfy everyone's intelligence needs, especially during a conflict when transportation limitations may restrict personnel flow to the theater. During operations in Haiti, for example, a few DIA HUMINT personnel required specialized technical support on very short notice. The DIA organization responsible for this support, with manning over 200, was unable to respond within the necessary timelines. The Air Force office (consisting of three enlisted personnel) which provided the same type of support provided the necessary service within one day. This is no slight to DIA but a simple illustration of why the Services need their own assets to perform HUMINT functions when outside agencies are unable to assist due to higher priority obligations.

In summary, the Air Force needs an organic HUMINT capability because of special skills associated with the debriefing process, the need for collectors to have Service-specific technical knowledge and general background, and the inability of other HUMINT organizations to provide full-time support due to conflicting priorities and limited manning. These considerations also apply to the other functions included in Air Force HUMINT.

Enemy prisoner interrogation. DESERT STORM taught two lessons about enemy prisoner interrogation: first, that it can provide invaluable information about an enemy's forces, morale, plans, and vulnerabilities; and second, that the vast majority deals with *ground forces*.³ Of over 300 interrogation reports received by the US Central Air Forces intelligence staff in Riyadh, only three dealt with highly significant Air Force topics. As one Air Force Reserve

interrogator put it, "Although we were the primary producers of 90% of the intelligence produced...this information was 99% ground order-of-battle in nature."⁴ Operations in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE likewise afforded only limited access to prisoners with air-related information.

The lessons of DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE have the following implications for Air Force interrogation. First, an interrogation capability is necessary to give the air component intelligence director the ability to respond flexibly to time-sensitive, Air Force-related opportunities if and when they occur. The second implication is that the Air Force need not deploy a vast number of interrogators to the theater until and unless the COMAFFOR/A2 needs them. This is based on past experience and the increasing likelihood of MOOTW operations which will produce ground force enemy prisoners (if any) rather than jet fighter pilots.

The interrogation function raises two special questions. How will the A2 know if a prisoner has air-related information? And does interrogation require special skills beyond those of debriefing, even to the point of requiring different personnel with specialized training?

In answer to the first question, it is already part of Army doctrine to contact other Service intelligence elements whenever an enemy prisoner shows knowledge that may be of value to that Service.⁵ If and when the Army, as Executive Agent for all enemy prisoner operations, identifies a prisoner with information vital to COMAFFOR interests, the A2 can dispatch a HUMINT collector from his or her staff to conduct the interrogation. For reasons already explained, an Air Force collector with HUMINT training, knowledge of Air Force technology and requirements, time to dedicate to the activity, and dedicated communications back to the A2 is the person best qualified to get the most out of this or any theater collection opportunity.

The alternative to relying on the Army to identify prisoners with airpower information would be to place large numbers of Air Force collectors at Army prisoner facilities and the front lines in hopes of being the first to "catch" the elusive fighter pilot. This not only far exceeds the 15-person manning level in Air Intelligence Agency's HUMINT initiative, but also puts Air Force collectors in unnecessary physical danger, complicates theater coordination, and essentially duplicates a mission for which the Army is thoroughly trained and well manned. The limited nature of an Air Force HUMINT capability precludes any misguided efforts to "play Army."

Regarding the relationship of debriefing and interrogation skills, one must start with the definition of intelligence interrogation from Joint Pub 1-02: "Systematic effort to procure information by direct questioning of a person under the control of the questioner."⁶ Referring back to the earlier definition for debriefing, the only clear difference is the aspect of "control." An individual being debriefed is cooperating voluntarily; an enemy prisoner is not. The process of direct questioning, careful listening, judicious elicitation, and precise recording--all possibly in a foreign language--is common to both procedures, as is the need to report resulting information in a clear, concise format. This is why an Air Force interrogation handbook states that "Most valid information will be acquired using a formal, but friendly, direct approach."⁷

The only real procedural difference between a debriefing and interrogation occurs when a prisoner resists questioning and must be pressured to reveal information using special verbal approaches. But as experience in the Falklands conflict, JUST CAUSE, and DESERT STORM showed, the overwhelming majority of prisoners are more than happy to answer any questions posed - and even some that aren't.

One may safely say, then, that the vast majority of interrogations are conducted as though they were debriefs, but no debriefs are conducted as (hostile) interrogations. The process of interrogation is thus a subset of debriefing, but one which still requires above all good elicitation and reporting skills. Although training in the special methods of interrogating an uncooperative prisoner may be valuable in limited situations, the overriding ability of Air Force HUMINT personnel should be in debriefing. Of all Air Force collectors deployed during the Gulf war, those with prior debriefing training and experience were most productive and confident at conducting interrogations. They were also most capable of helping less skilled, inexperienced personnel who had only interrogation training.

In summary, Air Force HUMINT should be capable of conducting a limited interrogation function, subject to the needs and wishes of the air component commander. At the same time, it should not attempt to duplicate the size, training, and mission already assigned to the Army. Air Force collectors may receive basic training in interrogation methods, but it is absolutely mandatory that they have thorough training and day-to-day experience in debriefing.

Document Exploitation. This function generates the same basic questions as enemy prisoner interrogation. Although captured documents can conceivably satisfy component intelligence needs, there is a much higher probability that the majority in any future operations will deal with ground forces. Just as for interrogations, the A2 should rely on the Army to advise him or her if captured documents contain air-related information. Since reviewing and reporting on a captured computer disk or correspondence clearly does not require the skill of a debriefer, it's up to the A2 to decide if the opportunity is worth dispatching a HUMINT collector or an intelligence generalist with Service background and technical knowledge. The advantage to

sending a HUMINT collector would be his or her skill in preparing comprehensive intelligence reporting for use by the entire Intelligence Community.

Observation. This function is usually associated with Army Long Range Surveillance and Special Operations Forces operations.⁸ The Air Force does not use "Scouts" as is common in mechanized infantry, relying instead on the observations of operational personnel and reconnaissance/technical platforms for this type of collection. Nevertheless, in response to immediate, critical intelligence needs, and in the absence of other personnel in the area in question, an A2 could dispatch a member of his or her HUMINT team to directly observe conditions and report the results for optimal use by Service, joint, and theater forces. Here again, the HUMINT officer's expertise in translating observed data into a useable intelligence report tailored to Service-specific needs makes him or her the best candidate for these very limited situations.

Collection Management. According to Colonel Allen Thomas, Commander of Air Force HUMINT in the European Theater during Operation DESERT STORM, HUMINT collection management can be of great benefit to a deployed A2.⁹ Collection management for a collector would include accessing, prioritizing, and interpreting raw HUMINT information from a variety of outside sources, and providing it to the appropriate COMAFFOR members (analysts, targeteers, and operators) in a timely manner. The same personnel can also review priority Requests for Information for HUMINT collection suitability and pass them quickly and clearly to the appropriate Service, theater, or national agencies in the required format. In the event the Air Force identified an individual with highly valuable information, they could go one step further by guiding collection efforts, either by Air Force or other debriefers.

Although this function includes some characteristics of a full-time "collection manager" and intelligence "analyst," it would be restricted in any Air Force capability to address only HUMINT issues of direct and immediate need to the A2 leading to tasking. The typical collection manager assesses customers' requirements from the entire Intelligence Community. He or she then either obtains the requested data from a ready source or tasks any one of several intelligence organizations--e.g., CIA--to collect the appropriate information via signals intelligence, imagery, or HUMINT. The community analyst fuses and interprets raw data from all available collection disciplines to produce "finished" intelligence, i.e., a comprehensive assessment of a situation or topic and its impact on US security.

Air Force HUMINT collectors would not have the training, focus, or time to attempt all of these duties. Rather, they would use their training and experience--unique from that of the intelligence generalist--to identify the value of available HUMINT reporting, make it available to members of the COMAFFOR, recommend which of the A2's requirements might be most suitable for HUMINT collection, and possibly guide the debriefing of the rare, "gold mine" source.

Coordination. Both General Miller, the AIA Commander, and Colonel Thomas agree this is another area in which Service HUMINT can play an important role. In the coordination function, Air Force HUMINT personnel must deal effectively with other Service, DoD, US government, and coalition players who have HUMINT capabilities, interests, and operations. Activities could include briefing the Joint Force Commander's intelligence staff on Air Force debriefing operations, coordinating refugee debriefings with the Army, or planning joint activities with British or French partners. Here again, it is the HUMINT collector's special

training and experience--acquired in peacetime--which would make him or her the most appropriate individual to perform this task.

Peacetime Functions

The preceding functions demonstrate how Air Force HUMINT can benefit the COMAFFOR and A2 during conflict. It is a unique feature of the discipline that the same capability not only delivers significant benefits during peacetime, but also becomes better prepared for conflict in the process. Specifically, the HUMINT personnel who deploy during a conflict can debrief operational personnel on air component needs during peacetime. This produces two major benefits: first, it captures valuable information which could be essential in future conflicts and makes it available to the entire Intelligence Community; and second, it provides experience crucial to a collector's future duties within the component, Air Intelligence Agency, Air Staff, or DHS. In addition, other intelligence personnel in the components become familiar with the HUMINT discipline and personnel before deploying to a conflict.

Perhaps the greatest value of peacetime Air Force HUMINT is that it conforms to the universally accepted imperative that intelligence collection--especially HUMINT--should begin now to support military and national leaders during crisis. Reporting on the condition of a remote airfield in a developing country may not seem like the most crucial activity today, but it is precisely the type of information which a COMAFFOR and Joint Force Commander will have to know in the event of MOOTW or conflict in the area.

Just as for activities in wartime, peacetime Air Force HUMINT must address Service-unique needs, from local ground-to-air and air-to-air weapons systems to local air force training levels. Air Force collectors with debriefing training and experience, aerospace technical knowledge, and Service background would be best qualified to obtain and report the required

information. This is especially true when other HUMINT elements cannot perform the same function due to level of support and manning limitations.

The last consideration is most important during peacetime. As indicated earlier, both CIA and DHS must follow the tasking direction of the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center. Operations by these organizations in support of national and theater needs obviously focus on the areas of greatest immediate threat and instability, preempting collection against lower-threat areas. But the major commands and numbered air forces conduct training, liaison, and MOOTW operations precisely in these "low-threat" environments on a daily basis. As an example, Air Force doctrine sets out these standing intelligence requirements to support joint airlift operations: availability of fuel; maintenance support; loading capability; crew rest facilities; and related infrastructure.¹⁰

Since national and theater-level HUMINT organizations do not have unlimited manpower to collect information in these areas, it's imperative that the Air Force be able to satisfy its own recurring intelligence needs through HUMINT. DHS has recognized the benefits of this approach by helping 12th Air Force develop its own limited, peacetime collection program in support of USSOUTHCOM. Having a formal, Air Force-wide HUMINT program would afford the same intelligence benefits to all numbered air forces and major commands, standardize operations and methods, and monitor the training and career progression of HUMINT personnel. It would have the added advantage of preventing uncoordinated DHS operations on Air Force installations.

Summary

So far, we have looked at what Air Force HUMINT collectors would do: conduct overt, non-sensitive debriefings of a variety of Service and other personnel, in peace and wartime, in

direct support of NAF and MAJCOM requirements; report resulting intelligence information in required formats to Service, joint, theater, and national customers; conduct interrogation, document exploitation, and reconnaissance on an as-needed basis; perform limited collection management; and coordinate with other HUMINT elements. Although Force Protection should be a top collection requirement for Air Force HUMINT debriefings, it should not be an assigned operational function. Specialized counterintelligence operations are the sole domain of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

We have also considered why the Air Force needs its own organic capability to perform these functions: special training and experience requirements of the HUMINT discipline; Air Force needs which demand technical aerospace knowledge and general Service background; and inability of other HUMINT organizations to fulfill all Service component intelligence needs, especially in currently stable areas of the world.

We now turn to the question of how the Air Force should implement HUMINT.

How

For the present, the Air Force must organize, train, and equip the 15 active duty billets at Air Intelligence Agency and 50+ Reserve Individual Mobility Augmentees (IMAs) to best support the NAFs and MAJCOMs during peacetime and conflict. This assumes that three staff billets at AIA headquarters will remain dedicated to liaison with the Air Staff and outside agencies; developing doctrine, plans, and procedures; and preparing budgets. Following the sage advice to 'Train as you fight, and fight as you train,' we'll first deal with the peacetime structure, then move to a deployment structure. The chapter will end with comments on use of the Reserves, training, and equipment.

Peacetime Structure

There are basically two ways in which the 15-member HUMINT cadre can support the air component commands with operational debriefing during peacetime. It can distribute some of its members to the NAFs and MAJCOMs or operate out of Air Intelligence Agency. In either case, the 67th Intelligence Wing should form a small staff to perform the following: manage the IMA program; coordinate training; identify, recruit, and track personnel; arrange exercise development and participation; and possibly assist in high-priority debriefs.

Retaining all 15 HUMINT billets at AIA would provide centralized control. However, it would severely diminish support to the NAFs and MAJCOMs and deny their intelligence staffs the opportunity to work and train with HUMINT personnel. This makes placing personnel at the components the only reasonable option.

There are also two ways to assign HUMINT collectors to the NAFs and MAJCOMs. AIA can transfer its TIARA billets to the component intelligence structures or include them in multi-discipline Information Operations Detachments (IODs) which it is proposing to collocate with each NAF and MAJCOM.¹¹

Transferring HUMINT billets to the air components would result in complete dedication to their collection needs. But years of experience have shown that this approach can "dilute" the intended mission by diverting scarce resources to non-HUMINT tasks and by cutting the "tether" to a central source of standardization, planning, and coordination support.

Active duty HUMINT personnel can best support the component commands during peacetime from within the IOD structure. Providing HUMINT and TECHINT expertise in a single element would provide optimal operational support while still maintaining contact with a central base at AIA. During a conflict, the same IOD--augmented as necessary from other IODs--

-would deploy with the component and continue to perform HUMINT activities under operational control of the theater A2.

What if a component commander does not choose to use the HUMINT capability of an IOD? Then he or she should not be forced to accept a resource which may go unused. At the same time, NAFs and MAJCOMs may follow 12th Air Force's example by designating members of their own intelligence staffs to perform HUMINT duties. Besides increasing the capability of the component, these individuals would benefit from working with IOD personnel and from the support and guidance of a centrally managed AIA program.

Deployment Structure

HUMINT members of a deployed IOD would be available to perform any of the previously described functions at the direction of the A2. To assist them, they would have the advantage of a "reach back" capability to AIA for administrative, policy, and material support. The A2 can set the size of the IOD's HUMINT contingent depending on the operational environment, but four to six personnel proved adequate to conduct activities required by USCENTAF during DESERT STORM.

As part of the IOD structure, we must pay special attention to the activities of Air Force HUMINT assets within theater. If an A2 directs his or her HUMINT assets to conduct an aircrew debriefing 100 miles from headquarters, how do they get there? The simple answer is 'however they can.' In other words, HUMINT members of the IOD would use any available transportation available--Air Force, Army, ground, or air--to carry out the A2's orders. This approach makes collectors totally dependent on COMAFFOR and theater resources, but it did not pose a problem for personnel assigned to USCENTAF during DESERT STORM. This was because the Chief of Intelligence insured support was available--including dedicated helicopter

and fixed wing aircraft--to accomplish his critical taskings. More recently, a captain who spent several weeks in Haiti armed only with a laptop computer produced extensive tactical reporting relying solely on Army transportation. The alternative to depending on resources already in place is to train and equip HUMINT personnel for independent action within theater.

In March 1997 AIA approved a 67th Operations Support Squadron concept of operations to deploy Mobile Interrogation Teams (MITs) throughout an area of operations to perform interrogation and other operational activities.¹² The MITs, composed of three HUMINT personnel, would bring their own transportation (HMMWV), weapons, mobility gear, and computer/communications equipment into theater. They would respond to A2 tasking through a HUMINT element in the A2 staff; collocate with joint/army facilities, including those in forward areas; or move independently through the theater looking for collection opportunities.

There are three main pitfalls associated with the MIT concept. First, it will cost approximately \$280,000 to equip each team. The team then becomes responsible for maintaining its own equipment in the field--a task which DESERT STORM showed to be extremely difficult. Prioritizing shipment of a MIT's gear within theater airlift flow would also make availability unpredictable. Given the higher priority of combat materiel, initial HUMINT activities would probably have to rely on resources already in theater in any event.

Second, detailing Air Force HUMINT collectors to Army units or allowing them to roam through a theater decreases their availability to the A2 and increases the complexity of conducting operations. If a MIT positions itself with an Army unit 300 miles from the COMAFFOR in hopes of interrogating the one-in-a-million enemy pilot or aircraft mechanic, then that's three collectors who can't debrief operational personnel or coordinate with coalition members.

An example would illustrate this point. During DESERT STORM, USCENTAF had no control over the tasking or utilization of over 50 active duty and Reserve Air Force HUMINT personnel detailed to Army prisoner camps to conduct interrogations. Although the performance of these personnel was outstanding, they reported almost exclusively on ground forces information. Resulting data certainly benefited the ground component commander and overall theater efforts, but it did not satisfy Air Force-unique intelligence requirements. Under current joint doctrine, this would not constitute an authorized use of organic HUMINT assets, especially given the Army's executive position in prisoner interrogation.

If not detailed to or collocated with an Army facility, then what about independent movement? To have a MIT roaming a theater in search of collection opportunities would not only reduce their availability for short-notice A2 tasking, but would also require constant coordination with other theater players. This would be necessary to assure their activities were secure and did not duplicate or conflict with other ongoing efforts.

Third, the concept's proposed activity near or in hostile areas would be both hazardous and potentially ineffective at answering tactical Air Force intelligence needs. As an Air Force HUMINT veteran of DESERT STORM put it, "Not only will placing our MITs in forward areas make them less valuable to the Air Force, [but] it will also require us to spend more time and money providing combat training for them and force us to rely on the good will of the Army to provide support to our people."¹³

The whole idea of MITs points to a basic weakness in the original HUMINT concept of operations. As its name indicates, it focuses on interrogation as the primary function of HUMINT. Not only did this prove not to be the case during DESERT STORM, but it will also be even less likely in future MOOTW scenarios. The core value of the HUMINT discipline is its

ability to satisfy Service-unique component command intelligence requirements by debriefing individuals--both in peacetime and conflict. This may include interrogating enemy prisoners on rare occasions, but it is misleading to the component commander to imply this will be Air Force HUMINT's most important function or source of most valuable information. It is thus incumbent on Air Force intelligence management to portray the strengths and weaknesses of HUMINT accurately, and tailor its capability to best meet the needs of the NAFs and MAJCOMs.

But what if a component commander wants to plan for and deploy MITs? Then Air Force intelligence should clearly explain all the associated pro's and con's, and attempt to meet the components' needs within the IOD structure to the greatest extent possible given current resources. A MAJCOM will not be able to write its Operations Plans to include deploying 20 MITs within the first 10 days. But, the supporting IOD may be able to plan on one or two within a reasonable time--especially if the MAJCOM contributes its resources, such as vehicles.

Reserves

During peacetime, HUMINT IMAs are constrained to interrogation training, exercise participation, and routine active duty tours. This is because the debriefing function requires full time availability and constant practice. A collector without prior training or experience cannot become truly proficient at debriefing aircrews and writing intelligence reports just on weekends and for two weeks per year. For this reason, IMAs without any background in collecting should be used to "backfill" HUMINT positions left vacant by active duty personnel.

At the same time, in the absence of sufficient numbers of qualified personnel, the Air Force should be able to respond to a potential "surge" demand for interrogators--as unlikely as this requirement may be. A small cadre of qualified IMAs trained in interrogation techniques

would satisfy this potential need. Since good debriefing skills are the basis for a successful interrogation, any IMAs deployed must have previous debriefing experience. This could include active duty Service collecting or comparable experience in another organization, e.g. the CIA.

Training

The most important acquired skills for a HUMINT collector are debriefing and reporting. As stated earlier, most prisoner interrogations amount to debriefings under special circumstances. DoD debriefing training is provided through the Defense Strategic Debriefing Course (DSDC), Ft Huachuca AZ. This program, which lasts about four weeks, requires students to role play during a variety of debriefing scenarios, apply intelligence requirement tasking, practice elicitation techniques, record information accurately, and publish clear, concise information reports. These are the specific skills which will differentiate between an Air Force HUMINT collector and intelligence generalist. Foreign language training is also a definite "plus" in debriefing foreign nationals, coordinating with host nation representatives, and interrogating enemy prisoners.

Formal interrogation training is available through the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Interrogation of Prisoners of War course offered at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center in Dam Neck VA. Attendance at this course should be limited to a few IMAs, who will then train other IMAs and active duty (as available). Reserve HUMINT personnel performed this function admirably during the days of organized Air Force HUMINT.

Under the category of "nice to have" for active duty personnel fall courses in collection management (from DIA) and Force Protection (from AFOSI). This type of formal instruction is not essential for an effective HUMINT capability and should be reserved for cases in which an individual has "time to fill" between assignments.

Another valuable source of training and experience is exercises. Air Force exercises such as BLUE FLAG, Army events such BOLD KNIGHT, joint exercises such as FOAL EAGLE, and multinational exercises such as VIGILANT SHIELD provide invaluable opportunities for Air Force HUMINT members to interact with other components, Services, and nations. IOD HUMINT members should attend broad scale exercises involving several components or Services, and IMAs should concentrate on interrogation-specific events.

Equipment

Besides standard mobility gear, the most important equipment for Air Force HUMINT collectors is a dependable computer and dedicated, secure communications system which will guarantee timely reporting to the supported A2. These items are essential for all HUMINT activities--from refugee debriefs to coalition liaison--and can usually deploy with the individual. They are far more critical to HUMINT operations than the dedicated HMMWV, air conditioning, weapons, and other materiel associated with a MIT, and less costly in the bargain.

This ends our examination of the 'what, why, and how' of Air Force HUMINT. A list of recommended actions to implement Air Force HUMINT is included at Appendix A.

Notes

¹ Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, Annex A to Appendix C, *Human Intelligence* (U), 20 November 1996, C-A-4. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

² Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, 20 November 1996, vii.

³ Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 1992), 159-160

⁴ Maj Steven Kleinman, USAFR, memorandum to the 67th Operations Support Squadron (AIA), subject: The Future of USAF HUMINT, 26 November 97, 3.

⁵ Army Field Manual (FM) 34-37, *Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 15 January 1991, 6-10.

⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *DoD Dictionary*, April 1997, 277.

Notes

⁷ Capt Nikos Katranzos, Detachment 32, Pacific Special Activities Area, Interrogation Handbook, 28 November 1986, 13.

⁸ Army Field Manual (FM) 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 27 September 1994, 2-4.

⁹ Col Allen Thomas, Air Intelligence Agency, Kelly AFB TX, interviewed by author, 9 December 1997.

¹⁰ Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 30, *Airlift Operations*, 1 October 1995, 6.

¹¹ IOD was the term used when the concept originated; it is currently being changed to Information Operations Cadre, but IOD will be used throughout this paper for consistency.

¹² Concept of Operations, 67th Operations Support Squadron (AIA), subject: USAF Active-Duty HUMINT Flight (U), Appendix A, *Mission* (U), 4 March 97. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

¹³ Message, 031800Z JUN 94, Operating Location Los Angeles (696IG) to 67th Intelligence Group, 3 June 1994.

Chapter 4

Conclusions

Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered.

—Sun Tzu
The Art of War

Air Force HUMINT should support the air component commands during peacetime and deployment by assigning trained, experienced collectors to AIA's Information Operations Detachments. The same personnel who conduct debriefings in support of NAF and MAJCOM requirements during peacetime would then deploy with the IOD during conflict or MOOTW to continue support under the A2's direct operational control. IMAs would backfill any staff positions left vacant by active duty personnel, and could augment the deployed IOD's interrogation function if deemed necessary by the A2.

Air Force HUMINT personnel would ideally deploy with dedicated computer and communications equipment. Once in theater, they would perform all functions assigned by the A2 using COMAFFOR and theater resources. MITs would only be developed and deployed at the direct request of the A2, and would possibly include supporting NAF or MAJCOM assets.

It is essential that all Air Force active duty HUMINT personnel attend the Defense Strategic Debriefing Course. Language training (or knowledge) suitable for the supported NAF is highly desirable. IMAs should attend limited formal interrogation

training and then pass on their training, tailored for Air Force needs, to the other IMAs and active duty collectors. When operations permit, participation in exercises is an excellent source of training for active duty collectors, IMAs, and personnel from other components, Services, and countries.

This paper has provided many reasons why the Air Force should create an organic HUMINT collection capability pursuant to joint guidelines. But along with this positive outlook must come a word of caution: HUMINT does not exist to debrief, interrogate, or coordinate. In the final analysis, Air Force HUMINT is only justifiable so long as the resulting intelligence information supports the unique requirements of the NAF and MAJCOM customers.

And in order to make this happen, Air Force intelligence leadership must be committed to its widespread use and consistent support (both monetary and programmatic). As Colonel Thomas puts it, HUMINT may only need a "nickel" each year, but if you disrupt the investment, you can't recoup the loss by paying a "quarter" the next year.¹ The cost for failing to produce the steady flow of information possible from HUMINT may be paid in human lives when a crisis erupts

The proposals in this paper provide a framework in which Air Force HUMINT can prove itself a valuable complement to the technical collection disciplines. But if the Service intelligence community does not find the products of HUMINT worth the effort and cost to support it, then leadership must have the courage to completely divest itself of the discipline and rely on other intelligence collection methods and agencies.

Notes

¹ Col Allen Thomas, Air Intelligence Agency, Kelly AFB TX, interviewed by author, 9 December 1997.

Appendix A

Air Force HUMINT Implementation Recommendations

1. AIA's 67th Intelligence Wing should transfer billets from the 15-member cadre within its 67th Operations Support Squadron to the new Information Operations Detachments (IODs). Once the detachments are established at requesting NAFs and MAJCOMs, AIA should work with AFPC to fill the billets with personnel having prior HUMINT experience whenever possible.
2. The 67th Intelligence Wing should establish a small HUMINT staff to provide oversight and coordination for HUMINT manning, training, and operations at the IODs, and to manage the IMA program. In view of the staff's worldwide responsibilities to the component commands in peacetime and conflict, the director should at least hold the rank of Major (O-4) and have prior HUMINT operational experience.
3. AIA should retain its headquarters HUMINT staff to provide operational doctrine, external coordination, and program management.
4. All active duty personnel must attend DSDC at a minimum before entering an Air Force HUMINT position. Foreign language capability is highly desirable, and personnel assigned to a NAF IOD should receive language training appropriate to the supported theater. HUMINT members of IODs may also receive limited interrogation

training from IMAs when available. Consideration may be given to courses in collection management and force protection.

5. When operational demands permit, the 67th Intelligence Wing and IODs should schedule active duty HUMINT personnel to participate in Service, joint, and combined exercises. HUMINT IMAs should take part in exercises focusing on interrogation and document exploitation.

6. Unless the A2 directs otherwise, IODs should plan on deploying with a minimum number of HUMINT personnel. Only after assessing the theater, conditions, and likelihood of enemy prisoners with air-related information should the IOD request augmentation with active duty collectors from other IODs or Reserve personnel.

7. Unless specifically requested by an A2, AIA should abandon the MIT concept due to cost, deployment difficulties, potential conflict with other activities in theater, unnecessary physical risk to personnel, and low probability of access to air-related collection opportunities. In responding to A2 tasking, HUMINT personnel will rely on local transportation and logistic support. AIA should use part of the currently proposed MIT budget to provide IOD HUMINT members with independent computer and communications systems.

8. If an A2 requires MITs to support wartime operations plans, AIA should attempt to satisfy the requirements within resource limitations, using supported NAF or MAJCOM assets if necessary.

9. The 67th Intelligence Wing should use HUMINT IMAs initially to backfill for deployed active duty personnel. Deployed IODs will recommend to the A2 when and if

IMA interrogator augmentees are needed in theater. Only IMAs with prior debriefing experience will augment deployed IODs.

10. The 67th Intelligence Wing should schedule interrogator training for a limited number of HUMINT IMAs. These will then train the rest of the IMAs and active duty IOD members.

Appendix B

Air Force HUMINT Survey Methodology

In order to gain a representative picture of how the Air Force intelligence community regards the concept of an organic HUMINT capability, I sent the Air Force-approved survey at Appendix C to twenty senior managers at the Air Staff, AIA, NAFs, and MAJCOMs. From these, I received seventeen replies. I personally interviewed seven "target" participants, as well as the Air Intelligence Agency commander, Brigadier General James Miller. I have quoted individuals only when they gave me express permission to do so.

The survey consisted of a one-page description of Air Force HUMINT, including the basic proposal and options; nine questions with space for narrative replies; and ten statements requiring reactions from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree", and Not Applicable. I e-mailed the surveys to all parties along with a cover memo. A compilation of the numerical replies and (non-attributable) narrative comments appears at Appendix D.

We may draw the following generalizations from the responses provided. Most respondents agreed that the Air Force would benefit from an organic HUMINT capability performing Service member debriefs, collection management, theater coordination, and enemy prisoner interrogation on a case-by-case basis under A2 control. Responses were

mixed on the value of debriefing returned US prisoners. Although respondents were split on whether Air Force HUMINT collectors should be detailed to Army facilities to conduct interrogations, this question received the highest number of negative numerical replies. The question of self-sufficient MITs operating throughout a theater received the second highest number of negative inputs, but the majority of replies were favorable towards some capability. Responses concerning dedicating existing TIARA resources to create an Air Force HUMINT capability were also mixed, but the majority agreed in principle. Finally, most participants felt there was a place for HUMINT IMAs both as backfills for active duty personnel and as potential theater augmentees.

Although most numerical replies were positive, I feel that the incidence of negative comments indicates a lack of support for, or at least understanding of HUMINT among some members of Air Force intelligence. This is not an inherently troublesome situation. It is simply the customer base expressing its wishes based on current understanding. At the same time, there are other intelligence customers who enthusiastically support the HUMINT discipline, to the point of forming their own collection capabilities by taking resources "out of hide."

What this means for Air Force intelligence is that it must press ahead with creating a formal, centrally managed HUMINT program tailored to meet the needs of those NAFs and MAJCOMs who want it. Indeed, there are not sufficient billets, bodies, or IOD structures at this time to support all the component commands. The answer, then, is that AIA should begin IOD HUMINT support where it is most desired, e.g., 12th Air Force.

A "proof of concept" approach using the 15 billets already identified would have two benefits. First, by starting on a small scale with a NAF positive towards HUMINT, there will be better opportunities to "work out the bugs" in peacetime and conflict support. And second, it will serve as a model for other components to observe and decide if they wanted to receive the same collection support.

Appendix C

Air Force HUMINT Survey Form

The next three pages comprise the approved Air Force HUMINT survey sent to 20 senior Air Force Intelligence leaders via e-mail. (Survey Control Number USAF SCN 97-90.)

AIR FORCE HUMINT

Background

I. History

Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) uses people as the source of intelligence information as opposed to technical platforms. It can encompass a spectrum of activities from classic agent operations to routine aircrew debriefs. The Air Force had a centralized HUMINT capability from 1982 until 1995, when (under OSD directive to the Services) it transferred all its billets to Defense Intelligence Agency to create the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS). The OSD direction effecting this action allowed the Services to retain their own HUMINT capability to meet specific needs not covered by DHS.

II. Functions

For the purposes of this research project, HUMINT may include any of the following functions:

A. Wartime Support to Intelligence component of theater Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR/A2):

1. Conduct HUMINT collection management and coordination with other HUMINT offices
2. Conduct air operations-related Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) interrogations and document exploitation
3. Debrief returned US Prisoners of War
4. Debrief USAF members (military and civilian) on observations/information of potential value.

B. Peacetime Support to NAFs/MAJCOMs:

Debrief USAF members (military and civilian) on observations/information of potential value.

NOTE: Planned activities will not encroach on Office of Special Investigation's (AFOSI) assigned mission of Force Protection. Collectors will focus on information needs of COMAFFOR, NAFs, and MAJCOMs. HUMINT personnel will coordinate activities at local and national level as required. Army remains executive agent of all EPW interrogation and document exploitation (DOCEX).

III. Structures

1. In a current initiative, Air Intelligence Agency is organizing, training, and equipping a small (15-person) cadre to manage and conduct Air Force-wide HUMINT. The cadre will also manage training of Reserve Individual Augmentees (IMAs), who will deploy with AIA active-duty personnel as required.
2. Deployment structures dedicated to the COMAFFOR/A2 could include the following options:
 - a. A 4-6 person HUMINT Control Element (HCE) drawn from the AIA cadre & NAF or MAJCOMs
 - b. HUMINT members of AIA Info Operations Detachments (IOD), augmented with AIA personnel
3. EPW interrogations could follow these approaches:
 - a. HCE/IOD members, using COMAFFOR resources (transport, comms, etc.) visit EPW holding areas on a selective, case-by-case basis and relay intelligence results directly to the A2
 - b. HCE/IOD members are detailed to Army interrogation facilities on part- or full-time basis
 - c. Self-sufficient, HCE/IOD-directed Mobile Interrogation Teams (MITs) of at least three interrogators operate independently (under ground forces' rules) or in Joint/Army interrogation facilities
4. Peacetime debriefings could utilize the following resources:
 - a. NAF or MAJCOM intelligence personnel, full- or part-time, possibly supplemented by AIA personnel in special cases
 - b. HUMINT members of AIA IO Dets, supplemented by AIA as needed

THANKS FOR YOUR HELP!

AIR FORCE HUMINT

Narrative Questions

In my research project for Air War College, I examine whether there is a place in the Air Force for an organic, dedicated HUMINT capability. To approach this issue objectively, I would like to ask for your candid, unclassified answers to the following questions: (you may use the space below or a separate page)

- a. Of the potential functions listed on page 1, which would you want to see implemented in the Air Force, and why?
- b. What functions/capabilities would you like to add to those already listed, and why?
- c. Which of the listed functions/capabilities would you not want the Air Force to implement, and why?
- d. Do you see any problems or pitfalls with implementing HUMINT in the Air Force?
- e. Which would you prefer: a limited interrogation capability within an HCE/IOD (dependent on the A2 for support); or relatively self-sufficient MITs (with vehicles) available for full time, mobile collection?
- f. If you see any of the proposed functions as being useful in terms of your wartime or peacetime missions, would you be willing to dedicate one of your current TIARA billets? (This is not a commitment!)
- g. Which should conduct routine (peacetime) debriefings: NAF/IN, MAJCOM/IN, IOD, or other?
- h. How should Air Force implement HUMINT—as in the above “Structures”, or some other way?
- i. Any additional comments or suggestions?

THANKS FOR YOUR HELP!

1-----2-----3-----4-----5 N/A
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree

- THANKS FOR YOUR HELP!

Appendix D

Air Force HUMINT Survey Results

Numeric Results

1. The COMAFFOR/A2 can benefit from a HUMINT collection management/coordination team.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	15
Neither:	0
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	2
Not Applicable:	0

2. The COMAFFOR/A2 can benefit from an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) interrogation capability.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	16
Neither:	0
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	1
Not Applicable:	0

3. A2 HUMINT personnel, using COMAFFOR resources, should conduct EPW interrogation on a case-by-case basis.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	14
Neither:	0
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	3
Not Applicable:	0

4. The A2 should detail AF collectors to Army interrogation units/centers on a part-time or full-time basis.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	8
Neither:	0
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	8
Not Applicable:	1

5. A2-directed, self-sufficient MITs should operate throughout a theater (under ground forces' rules.)

Strongly Agree/Agree:	11
Neither:	0
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	6
Not Applicable:	0

6. The COMAFFOR/A2 can benefit from a capability to debrief returned US Prisoners of War.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	10
Neither:	5
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	2
Not Applicable:	0

7. Operational debriefings of USAF members can benefit A2s, NAFs, and MAJCOMs during peacetime and conflict.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	12
Neither:	4
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	1
Not Applicable:	0

8. I am willing to dedicate one of my current TIARA billets to create a HUMINT capability.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	11
Neither:	0
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	5
Not Applicable:	1

9. Air Force Reserve IMAs should augment deployed HUMINT personnel in wartime.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	12
Neither:	3
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	2
Not Applicable:	0

10. Air Force Reserve HUMINT IMAs should backfill active duty personnel when the latter deploy.

Strongly Agree/Agree:	14
Neither:	0
Disagree/Strongly Disagree:	3
Not Applicable:	0

Narrative Results

a. Of the potential functions listed on page 1, which would you want to see implemented in the Air Force, and why?

- Wartime support to Intel component of COMAFFOR/A2. Recommend order of priority is: conduct EPW interrogations, conduct HUMINT collection management, debrief prisoners of war, debrief USAF members.

- Interrogators trained in Air Force's technologies, systems and tactics provide a unique knowledge base from which to base questioning and provide relevant answers to Intel shops supporting air operations. In wartime scenarios, the bulk of dedicated interrogators will come from the Army, whose focus and expertise may not be able to adequately serve the information needs of the COMAFFOR/A2.

- Providing AF-trained HUMINT collection managers could help prioritize Air Force-related requirements, assist in identifying EPWs with information of interest to the AF, assist in prioritizing assignment of AF-trained interrogators to selected EPWs, as well as provide insight to the process of satisfying AF-derived HUMINT requirements.

- None. My personal sense is that the resources used by HUMINTers are national assets, and therefore central management, tasking, and reporting under DIA is appropriate.

- I would like to see all implemented, in the same order of priority as listed in Part II above. Other forms of intelligence gives us the black and white picture. HUMINT provides those shades of gray that turns a "guesstimate" into predictive analysis.

- Limited POW interrogations. Unit would not be in theater and I would not bump priority TPPFD flow to move them within the first 15 days.

- In coordination with ARFORs, wartime option 1 and 3. Rationale: Army coordination is essential since the Army has Service primacy. HCE attachments to the A2 imbeds the element with the customer.

- A1 and some A2. Need for time-sensitive field info to [go] to A2 & JFACC for Info Ops, ATO, and IW [information warfare]

- We need wartime HUMINT support to the AFFOR/JFACC. Functions A1 (collection management) and A2 (interrogation/document exploitation) are the most critical. HUMINT can be an esoteric discipline (witness terms like NIP, SDR, KB, etc.); without some dedicated HUMINT expertise at the force level, the Air Force cannot effectively leverage DHS and its assets. An analogy would be trying to have a non-SIGINTer work with the US SIGINT System to satisfy AFFOR requirements – it would not be effective or efficient. We also need HUMINT personnel to exploit EPWs and captured documents. Even though the US Army is the executive agent for these functions, its personnel do not have the expertise or the assets (especially if we have large numbers of EPWs) to meet Air Force requirements in this field. It would be useful to have HUMINT personnel dedicated to functions A3 and A4, but these are less critical.

- The debriefing of USAF personnel in peacetime is useful, but in an era of limited resources, I would place this capability below the functions listed above.

- One aspect of HUMINT support that is not addressed is the role it plays in force protection, in peacetime, crisis, and wartime. I see three related roles: management of actual AF HUMINT assets, coordination with other HUMINT-related entities (such as DHS at the national level and OSI at the base/wing level), and coordination with host-country HUMINT services. Although DHS probably desires this last function, many foreign militaries have not progressed to our level of jointness and are still more comfortable with service-to-service relationships.

- HUMINT collection management and coordination--only as needed. Some components have a robust collection management capability, while others haven't a clue what info needs can be met through HUMINT, so say nothing of HUMINT capabilities. The latter category needs HUMINTers who could address such needs, as well as collect/report.

- EPW interrogation and DOCEX - would limit efforts to areas of A2 (aerospace) interest, using only personnel who are conversant in subject matter; otherwise, why not let US ground component interrogators do the job?

- Debrief returned US POWs- only when of specific interest to the AFFOR/A2, and in coordination with JSSA.

- Debrief USAF members - primarily in peacetime; imagine most would be too busy in wartime to address any but the highest-priority HUMINT needs. Rationale: a) Develop/maintain subject matter expertise and collection/reporting skills for wartime application; b) Collect operationally useful info that the components will have to have prior to H-Hour, and certainly before EPWs, detainees, refugees, etc., are available; c) in some scenarios, there will be no EPWs available; as a result, debrief of USAF members will be the only viable avenue to info.

b. What functions/capabilities would you like to add to those already listed, and why?

- None

- None

- None

- I would like to see more linguist/area specialist support to deployed units, especially in peacetime. This would improve cultural sensitivity and improve integration of effort between ourselves and our allies.

- None

- Include Force Protection as part of the team with OSI. Contrary to "encroachment" note, which is ludicrous after Kobar.

- USAF organic HUMINT cadre should be capable of conducting the full spectrum of overt HUMINT activities, including those types of activities normally run by DHS; however, it should undertake such types of activities only under the following conditions: 1) to address info needs of extreme importance to USAF; 2) when DHS satisfactorily cannot address those needs itself; 3) in full coordination with DHS.

c. Which of the listed functions/capabilities would you not want the Air Force to implement, and why?

- Peacetime support to NAFs/MAJCOMs. From an intelligence collection perspective, this is to be the primary focus [of] DHS. Assigning additional AF resources to perform a mission, which OSD chose to consolidate in DHS, does not seem fiscally prudent. As a service, AF should develop or get access to a collection management monitoring system through which we can monitor DHS' responsiveness to AF requirements. This system would be parallel to the COLISEUM system currently used across the services to track satisfaction of Intelligence Production Requirements.

- Any of them.

- None

- Peacetime collection management. Redundant to my current collection managers.

- 2b and 2c. For 2b, there exists a real potential for AF assets to be absorbed by the Army JIF. For 2c, the HCE is not directly associated with the AFFOR/A2.

- Least useful are debriefs of US POWs. Usually too late to be useful for JFACC.

- None - I think all are valid missions for a service-unique capability. The constraint we face is working a cost-benefit analysis. In a resource- and manpower-constrained world, we probably need to focus limited resources on those functions of greatest value to the AF.

d. Do you see any problems or pitfalls with implementing HUMINT in the Air Force?

- Yes. Implementation of an AF HUMINT initiative will require NAFs/MAJCOMs to resource this initiative out of current authorizations. Under current operating conditions, adding a new mission without additional resources impossible. [The MAJCOM level is] already using "intel overages" to perform functions considered to be high priority by senior managers. The intel overages, which account for about 20% of our current workforce, are not guaranteed into the future.

- [The] problem I see is creating a stovepipe within a community already regarded as a stovepipe organization.

- Obviously, recruiting and retaining skilled personnel is a problem. Offsets include recruiting those with pre-existing skills (immigrants, university-trained area specialists/ linguists, etc.) onto active duty and retaining skills with a strong IMA program.

- We are not getting any real value added from the current effort. We should concentrate on making DHS meet our peacetime requirements.

- Yes, mostly programmatic. The current fiscal environment makes it difficult for the Air Force to fund new start programs that have manpower attached, which are not directly associated with weapon systems.

- Money, people, and ability to focus on air component needs while under Army rules.

- Yes. Because DHS has subsumed most HUMINT functions, it will be next-to-impossible to sustain a career track for Air Force intelligence personnel in the HUMINT field. Not only will the numbers be small, but if individuals spend more than one-two tours in the field, they will probably be deferred for promotion. As a result, we will have people who spend a limited amount of time in the HUMINT field, then progress to other disciplines. Unfortunately, this means we will never be able to build the active-duty

expertise we once had in the HUMINT field. In this regard, building a capability in the reserves (either IMA or AFRC unit-based) can help offset the problems associated with an active-duty force.

- Major Obstacle No. 1--USAF will continue to falter in establishing an organic HUMINT capability unless/until the components articulate the need for such as a "must have" vs. a "nice to have."

- Major Obstacle No. 2--Attracting, training, and retaining suitable and qualified personnel.

- The attitude that "Toys (e.g., HMMWVs) = Capability."

- In a nutshell, I don't believe the AF can afford a large contingent of HUMINTers, separate from DHS, particularly considering the drawdown. I'd much rather keep 1N1s, 1N4s, and 1N0s. Perhaps a small cadre of experts at AIA would be acceptable, although 15 is too many. Instead, we need to force DHS to do its job and satisfy AF requirements.

- I realize the problem is that AF doesn't grow HUMINTers--we need to figure out how to train folds quickly and efficiently, particularly in interrogation techniques. Perhaps, we should build a course, and have non-operational linguists ID'd to perform the interrogation task during crises.

- We do not want to repeat problems created by "assigning" our collectors to JIFs in the desert. Our troops ended up doing admin/support work that took away from their primary jobs of screening, collection, and disseminating information. We need to do lots of exercising with the Army, to show how we do things. In the past, AF took the lead..to exercise and train with allies and US collection force.

e. Which would you prefer: a limited interrogation capability within an HCE/IOD (dependent on the A2 for support); or relatively self-sufficient MITs (with vehicles) available for full time, mobile collection?

- We would recommend pursuing a limited interrogation capability within an HCE/IOD, primarily due to a realistic assessment of resource implications. Pursuing the more self-sufficient MIT concept would require a much larger commitment in both equipment and personnel. Initial equipping, to include the vehicles, and ongoing maintenance/support of equipment would be significantly greater for MITs. In addition, support personnel would most likely be required in any UTC built to provide a theater with AF MITs. Again, this is a greater resource commitment in both personnel and the amount of peacetime training required to maintain deployment competencies.

- Neither. Rather than focusing on AFFOR, our direction should be to support the JFACC through the J2.

- A self-sufficient team would better meet collection priorities than a part-time effort.

- Limited staff assigned to the NAF in wartime.

- A2 has limited or no capability to support.

- We need a mix of both capabilities. For peacetime purposes (coordination, collection management, etc.), HUMINT personnel embedded into IO Dets can meet the requirement. They must also be the planners for employment of a more in-depth

capability in wartime, i.e. MITs. These can be sources from the Reserves, organized into UTCs, and mobilized for exercises.

- Prefer a limited interrogation capability that the A2 or IOD would dispatch to ground force units holding EPWs of high-priority interest to the AFFOR. (It would be the cadre's job to make the appropriate ground forces POCs cognizant of USAF needs, and establish SOP for the ground forces' alerting USAF to air-knowledgeable EPWs.) Should be "self-sufficient" only if it must provide its own transportation to reach those EPWs, and if it must take its own comm/ computer equipment to report/disseminate interrogation results on time.

- I believe a small team perhaps centralized at AIA could provide this [interrogation teams]. Don't believe each theater needs a full-time team.

- The Army won't let us roam around alone. There is a two-vehicle concept by the Army for mobility. We do not foresee a need to tool around the countryside to look for people to debrief. Army won't permit it anyway.

f. If you see any of the proposed functions as being useful in terms of your wartime or peacetime missions, would you be willing to dedicate one of your current TIARA billets?

- No. [We] have no TIARA billets.

- I would, but I don't.

- I have none.

- NO!

- AIA already is.

- Yes, I would.

- Unit priorities do not permit a full time HUMINT billet. While useful, there are other things which are much more important to my unit.

g. Which should conduct routine (peacetime) debriefings: NAF/IN, MAJCOM/IN, IOD, or other?

- DHS should conduct routine, peacetime debriefings. Our experience...is that most of the information which would be available in such debriefings is already documented in trip reports which are routed to appropriate individuals. Due to the broad range of research, development, test, and acquisition functions performed..., it would be almost impossible to track and evaluate...activities/personnel across the command and conduct subsequent debriefs.

- For this command...the Intel Flight.

- IOD

- DHS!!

- I believe the NAF, since it is the execution level organization in the Air Force, and consequently, the organization that should have the information requirements.

- NAF/IN. Air component level = operational level.

- I think we should leave this aspect to DHS, given the higher priority of other HUMINT functions. We can work such debriefings on an exception basis (e.g., an potentially hostile pilot who defects), calling upon the skills of our wartime MITs.

- For continuity/consistency, IODs (vice MAJCOM, NAF/INs) should conduct routine (peacetime) debriefings.

h. How should Air Force implement HUMINT—as in the above “Structures”, or some other way?

- AIA should prepare to provide AF-oriented HUMINT expertise to support COMAFFOR/A2. A small cadre located at AIA to manage the program would minimize the impact on current resource commitments and allow for expertise to be provided during wartime/contingency ops.

- IMAs should make up the bulk of the individuals trained in interrogation. This is a specific function which can be assigned to the IMAs and which would permit focused training [to] develop the necessary skills. If an IMA is assigned to support the interrogation, IDTs and annual tours could be oriented to accomplishing the training necessary to meet this requirement.

- In this scenario, a 4-6 person HCE could be drawn from both the active duty cadre at AIA, as well as IMAs trained to perform the interrogation mission.

- A small number of HCE personnel should be detailed to Army interrogation facilities on at least a part-time basis to help in identifying sources who could satisfy AF requirements and conduct initial debriefings. HCE members, using COMAFFOR/A2 resources, could then visit EPW holding areas on a selective, case-by-case basis for follow-up debriefings or to handle a large number of EPWs assessed as being able to satisfy AF requirements.

- Improve the process whereby DHS information flows to the Air Force.

- I would prefer IOD teams if teams could train in peacetime to focus on a single AOR. I don't think a 15-man team can maintain worldwide proficiency.

- Wartime assigned to NAF doing selected debriefings

- Believe the referenced option is the only feasible option at this time.

- Start with above structure and evolve in tasks. May have to do some DHS thinks by necessity.

- We need to normalize HUMINT the same we have other disciplines. The most critical HUMINT functions are collection management and planning for wartime support. The former should be performed at the force level, using a combination of personnel from our IO Dets and Air Intel Squadrons. The former will have the functional HUMINT skills we need, the latter will have the regional expertise and understanding of JFACC requirements to focus the collection effort. The planning for wartime employment can theoretically reside either at the MAJCOM or the force level. Our MAJCOMs now focus primarily on the organize-train-equip function, and may not have the time or expertise to properly plan for wartime employment. Merging this function with the HUMINT collection managers at the force level probably provides increased effectiveness (understanding of the theater, knowledge of requirements, etc.), and better efficiencies (reduced overhead, etc.)

- Air Force should focus its efforts on placement of HUMINTers within IODs. This presence would serve as the “anchor point” for a HUMINT Control Element/collector team during military ops. Reason I advocate this option, vice a centralized cadre: Because of the disparities in the organizational structures, capabilities, and needs of air components, a “one size fits all” solution is simply not viable, especially

when the resources of USAF HUMINT are as limited as they are now. On the other hand, the IOD is tailored to the unique needs of each component. Furthermore, within the IOD, HUMINT has a better opportunity to showcase its capabilities to the operational USAF, thereby improving the chance of those capabilities becoming, in USAF's eyes, a "must have."

- Reservists should be trained to do either [augmentation or backfilling.] Backfill concept makes sense because that is what they did until DHS took over. They ran the Combat Interrogation Course, the Field Interrogations Operations Course, and they managed some of the wartime operations.

i. Any additional comments or suggestions?

- Much of the great work that AFSAC did in the past is captured in various places (DHS, NAIC...) today. I see our challenge as inputting requirements and accessing information from an organization, a discipline, that really belongs to all the services.

- As you can see from the above, I think we need to recapture some HUMINT capability within the Air Force. We don't need a large active duty cadre - a couple of people per NAF/IO Det should suffice.

- In light of the current world disorder, and the near impossibility in anticipating how HUMINT will function in military operations, USAF should focus on skilled personnel, vice equipment, as its highest resource priority, thereby maximizing its adaptability to unforeseen circumstances.

- In light of the current fiscal and political environment, placement of HUMINTers within IODs should start with the premise that DHS is the primary DoD provider of HUMINT. Accordingly, first/foremost function of an IOD HUMINTer should be to "plug" the component into DHS; second, to identify what DHS does/will not provide to the operational component; and third, to assume "shortfalled" overt collection functions and capabilities on behalf of the component.

- Need to have small contingent to augment Army [in debriefing returned US POWs]. Don't expect to see too many POWs with specific data that can help AF. Also, we could probably train augmentees (not HUMINTers) to do this after hostilities--like we did after Vietnam.

- If there is a reason [for active duty] to deploy, HQs doesn't really need backfills since we do policy work. After all, we're living without this today--we can definitely live without it at HQs during hostilities.

- Need to have active duty personnel to train reservists and active duty personnel. Once active duty people are deployed the reservists would have to take over.

- Debriefings in peacetime may have significant training value in peacetime to keep techniques honed for wartime. Value of info collected is debatable, but has potential for high value at any given time. Operations where there is no DHS reps are extremely significant.

- DHS tells us what we want to hear most of the time so we don't complain. Now DHS hides behind their charter which says they cannot provide tactical info, just strategic/operational. TIARA provides for the warriors who shoot the bullets and drop the bombs.

Glossary

A2	Air Component Intelligence Staff
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AIA	Air Intelligence Agency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMAFFOR	Commander, Air Force Forces
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DHS	Defense HUMINT Service
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DSDC	Defense Strategic Debriefing Course
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War
HUMINT	Human Resources Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
IMA	Individual Mobility Augmentee
IOD	Information Operations Detachment
JFACC	Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JTF	Joint Task Force
MAJCOM	Major Command
MIT	Mobile Interrogation Team
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NAF	Numbered Air Force
NHRTC	National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
POW	(US) Prisoner of War
TECHINT	Technical Intelligence
TIARA	Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

USCENTAF
USCENTCOM
USSOUTHCOM

US Central Air Forces
US Central Command
US Southern Command

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